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Hoover: Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airplane Crashes

NOTES
RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN AIRPLANE CRASHES
In 1952, an Air Force B-47 strato-jet bomber caught fire and
exploded five thousand feet above the ground. All of the plane's
crew were killed, and flaming fuel and aircraft parts fell on a house
near Marianna, Florida. The house was severely damaged, and two
of the owner's children subsequently died of burns. Unable to prove
any negligent or wrongful act or omission, the plaintiff landowner
rested his case on res ipsa loquitur. Judgment was for the United
States in the trial court. When the case, Williams v. United States,
was heard by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court held:'
"We have no knowledge, judicial or otherwise, of what
would cause a jet airplane to explode in mid-air while in flight.
In the absence, as here, of evidence showing that such an accident would not occur except for negligence, there is no basis
for recovery."
This is the only reported airplane crash case applying Florida law
on the use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and the court denied
its application. The victim, who assumed no risks as to the aircraft's
construction, operation, maintenance, or hazards of travel, was made
to suffer the loss.
Negligence in such a situation is difficult to prove. The best
witnesses often die in a crash, the physical evidence is usually demolished or lost, and the direction of flight is difficult to reconstruct.
Only if res ipsa is held applicable 2can the plaintiff get his case to
the jury without proving causation.
Res ipsa is an evidentiary escape mechanism applied to help an
injured person circumvent the rule that the plaintiff has the burden
of proving negligence. Essentially, the doctrine is a rule of evidence,
applicable when the following conditions are met: (1) The instrumentality involved was within the exclusive control of the defendant
at the time of the injury, both as to operation and inspection; (2)
the injury was not the result of any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the plaintiff; and (3) the accident would not have
occurred had the defendant used due care. 3
1. 218 F.2d 473, 476 (5th Cir. 1955), affirming 115 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Fla.

1953).
2. PRossmR, ToRTs §43 (2d ed. 1955).
3.

9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2509

(3d ed. 1940).

[2721

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1961

1

NOTES
Florida Law
Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1961], Art. 4
ANALYSIS OF THE WILLIAMS DECISION

In the Williams decision, the court stated that the concept of res
ipsa presupposes that the cause of the accident is better known to
the defendant than to the plaintiff.4 This condition for the appli-

cability of the doctrine has been criticized, 5 and it apparently has not
been required in any recent Florida decisions. Such limitations on
the use of res ipsa may not impose an excessive disadvantage on the
plaintiff in a case involving a civilian aircraft. A report of investigation compiled by the Civil Aeronautics Board cannot be used in a
court, 6 but a transcript is available to the plaintiff and may be useful

in determining causation and securing evidence.
The Williams decision was based largely on the fact that the
aircraft involved was an Air Force jet bomber in an experimental
stage of development. Three years after Williams, in another case
involving a B-47 that crashed into a private home, a federal district
court in the fifth circuit allowed the plaintiff to use res ipsa.7 The
court distinguished the Williams decision, stating that the B-47 was
no longer an experimental aircraft and that the accident would not
have happened in the ordinary course of events if the defendant
had exercised due care. This finding had been predicted in Williams:
"A situation to which the doctrine was not applicable half a century
ago because of insufficient experience or lack of technical knowledge,
might today fall within the scope of the rule, depending on what experience was shown." 8
It seems unjust that an innocent property owner should be entitled to compensation only if the airplane that falls on his house is
at a "safe" phase of its development. This inequitable situation is
complicated by the fact that in negligence suits against the United
States the Federal Tort Claims Act is very strictly construed as to
waiver of immunity. 9 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the statute as requiring a negligent act, holding that
"liability does not arise by virtue either of U.S. ownership of an
'inherently dangerous commodity' or property, or of engaging in an
'extra hazardous activity'.' 0
No theory of strict liability for the operation of an inherently
dangerous instrumentality can be maintained against the government unless the state in which the cause arises has a statute that
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

218 F.2d at 476.
See PROssER, TORTS §42 (2d ed. 1955).
52 Stat. 10(b) (1938), 49 U.S.C. § §581, 582 (a) (2) (1958).
Sapp v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 496, 499 (W.D. La. 1957).
218 F.2d at 476.
See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
Id. at 45.
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defines the basis for liability. States that have adopted the Uniform
Aeronautics Act impose strict liability for ground damage in airplane
crash cases, 1 and a judgment against the federal government based
12
on one of these statutes has been upheld by a circuit court of appeals.
Florida has not adopted the Uniform Aeronautics Act, and the ordinary rules of negligence are applied. 13 In Williams the plaintiff based
his claim solely on the theory of negligence and relied on res ipsa
to overcome the evidentiary weaknesses of his case. The traditional
trespass-to-land doctrine has been used by ground victims as a
basis for a cause of action in airplane crash cases. 14 It has been used
successfully against the federal government,' 5 but in the 1953 case of
Dalehite v. United Statesl6 the Supreme Court held that the government has not waived immunity for strict liability. The trespass theory
intimates strict liability because any entry onto the land of another,
unless absolutely privileged, gives rise to liability."7 It is therefore
probable that the interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act as
barring waiver of immunity for claims based on strict liability is
applicable to actions in trespass.
TYPES

OF VICTIMS

Aviation accidents may be classified into two groups: those involving injury to passengers and those involving damage to persons
or property on the ground.
Because of the generally accepted rule that commercial air carriers
must exercise the highest standard of care to their passengers, res ipsa
has been used most successfully and most frequently in public carrier
cases. 18 Courts have not responded with enthusiasm to policy arguments aimed at imposing the special responsibilities of carriers upon
owners and operators of small, privately owned aircraft, and no more
11. See Vold, Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Forced Landings on
Ground Victims Outside Established Landing Areas, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1953).
12. United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.

934 (1953).
13. Shattuck v. Mullen, 115 So. 2d 597, 600 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
14. Margosian v. United States Airlines, 127 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1955);
Hann v. United States Airlines, 127 F. Supp. 950 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); Rochester Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N.Y. Supp. 469 (Monroe County Ct.

1933).
15. Gaidys v. United States, U.S. Av. 352 (10th Cir. 1952); Parcell v. United
States, 104 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. W. Va. 1951).
16. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
17. PgossER, TORTS §42 (2d ed. 1955).
18. See, e.g., Smith v. Pennsylvania Cent. Airlines Corp., 76 F. Supp. 940
(D.D.C. 1948); Ortiz v. Eastern Airlines, U.S. Av. 623 (D. Md. 1948); Kamienski
v. Blue Bird Air. Serv., 321 Ill. App. 340, 53 N.E.2d 131 (1944).
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than ordinary care for his passengers is required of such a detendant.19
Perhaps as a result of the post-war increase of small aircraft operations, Florida has approved application of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to aircraft owners. 20 The same policies underlying
this development of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine may
eventually result in the general application of res ipsa in small aircraft crash cases.
Res ipsa has been held applicable in ground damage cases involving plane crashes21 and objects falling from planes. 22 Unlike
passengers, persons on the ground are passive bystanders subjected
to the risks of passing aircraft without sharing in the direct benefits
of the activity. Nevertheless, courts require the aircraft owner or
operator to exercise only ordinary care as pertains to persons and
property on the ground; 23 and the Florida Supreme Court has made
it clear that unless a passenger relationship exists, the commercial
air carrier is held only to an ordinary standard of care. 24 This indicates that the inference of negligence furnished by res ipsa in commercial carrier crash cases is no stronger than in those involving
private aircraft.
HOW TO Usx REs IPSA LoQUITUR

Res ipsa is sometimes said to raise a rebuttable presumption of
negligence, 2r but under the law of most jurisdictions,26 including
Florida, 27 it merely establishes a permissible inference that may be
rejected by the jury. It is sometimes used unsuccessfully when the
plaintiff's attorney raises an inference of negligence by laying a factual
groundwork justifying the application of the doctrine but fails to
present sufficient additional evidence to prove his case to the jury.
19. Reynolds v. United States, 345 U.S. 1 (1952) (if the pilot dies, there is
a strong presumption of due care because of the desire for self-preservation); Morrison v. LeTourneau, 138 F.2d 339 ( 5th Cir. 1943); Smith v. Whitley, 223 N.C. 534,
27 S.E.2d 442 (1943); Hall v. Payne, 189 Va. 140, 52 S.E.2d 776 (1949).
20. Shattuck v. Mullen, 115 So. 2d 597, 601 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
21. United States v. Kesinger, 190 F.2d 529 (10th Cir. 1951); Norden v.
United States, 187 F. Supp. 594 (D.R.I. 1960); Kadylak v. O'Brien, U.S. Av. 8
(W.D. Pa. 1941).
22. D'Anna v. United States, 181 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1950); Goodwin v. United
States, 141 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.C. 1956); Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 372
(W.D. La. 1947).
23. Gruenke v. North American Airways Co., 201 Wis. 565, 230 N.W. 618
(1930).
24. Kasanof v. Embry-Riddle Co., 157 Fla. 677, 26 So. 2d 889 (1946).
25. Johnson v. Eastern Airlines, 177 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1949).
26. PRossER, ToRTs §42 (2d ed. 1955).
27. Hine v. Fox, 89 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1956); Frash v. Sarres, 60 So. 2d 924
(Fla. 1952).
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Whenever possible, the plaintiff should present specific proof of
negligence, either on the part of the pilot or of maintenance personnel.
Causation is often more difficult to prove than negligent conduct; and
the value of res ipsa lies in the fact that when it is successfully applied in a case in which the plaintiff has proved negligent conduct,
he does not incur the burden of showing precisely how the accident
28
happened.
This presents a problem as to whether a plaintiff can plead and
offer proof of specific negligence and still avail himself of the res
ipsa doctrine. Some jurisdictions have held that res ipsa is waived
when the plaintiff introduces specific evidence of negligence, 29 and
there has been considerable discussion on this point in Florida. The
Florida Supreme Court has stated by way of dictum that one who
offers proof of specific negligence may not avail himself of res ipsa.30
However, in McKinney Supply Co. v. Orvitz the Court stated that
"under the charge the jury could have returned a verdict for the
plaintiffs either on specific negligence or the res ipsa doctrine, and
31
thus appellants were given the benefit of either theory."
2
In the 1959 case of South Florida Hospital Corp. v. McCrea1
the Third District Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff's introduction of specific negligence did not preclude application of the doctrine. The Supreme Court discharged a petition for certiorari,
declaring that the opinions supporting the waiver theory were merely
stating obiter dicta. The issue is not yet completely settled, however,
and one writer has argued that the McCrea decision permits waiver
of res ipsa when the evidence reveals the precise cause of the action.'3
Notwithstanding the fact that in some jurisdictions the plaintiff
is precluded from offering proof of specific negligence, through skillful cross-examination of the defendant's witnesses the plaintiff may be
able to elicit information that either implies or directly shows a
28. See Kreindler, Use of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airplane Crash Cases, in
BELLI, TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS 97 (1958).
29. Cudney v. Midcontinental Airlines, 363 Mo. 922, 254 S.V.2d 682 (1953).
Goodheart v. American Airlines, 252 App. Div. 660, 1 N.Y.S.2d 288 (2d Dep't
1937), is a landmark aircraft crash case and is often cited as authority on this
point. But see Citrola v. Eastern Airlines, 264 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1959), in which
the court stated that the prohibition in Goodheart against charging the jury on
two theories was for the purpose of avoiding confusion, and that when the evidence from which negligence might be inferred is largely circumstantial, it is
not error for the jury to be instructed both on specific acts of negligence and on
res ipsa.
30. Roth v. Dade County, 71 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1954); West Coast Hosp.
Ass'n v. Webb, 52 So. 2d 803, 804 (Fla. 1951).
31. 96 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 1957). (Emphasis added.)
32. 112 So. 2d 393 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959), cert. discharged with opinion, 118
So. 2d 25, 30 (1960).
33. Daniels, Torts, 14 U. MIAMI L. REv. 631 (1960).
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lack of care on the part of the defendant; and this information can
34
be stressed in the closing argument.
CONCLUSION

Although res ipsa allows an inference of negligence to be substituted for evidence of specific negligent acts, the plaintiff must
present facts from which the jury may conclude that negligent conduct caused the injury. However, the doctrine cannot be used to
substitute judicial guesswork for evidence as to the cause of an
airplane crash.
Denial of the application of res ipsa in Williams v. United States
appears to be harsh treatment of a ground victim. However, res ipsa
could become such a powerful tool to the "bleeding plaintiff" that
the courts would often be allowing liability without any proof of
fault. Ground victims probably can rely on a trespass theory against
non-governmental defendants, but it is doubtful whether this theory
is applicable against the government. If Florida adopts a strict
liability statute, ground victims will be able to rely on it, even when
suing the federal government.
The practitioner must not overestimate the value of res ipsa in
crash cases. It will not be applicable unless the aircraft and its
equipment are past the experimental stage of development. When it
is applicable, the plaintiff need not eliminate all possible causes or
inferences, but he must be prepared to show that the accident was
more likely to have been caused by negligence than not. In Florida
the plaintiff's attorney should specifically plead negligence and offer
proof of any negligent conduct he can discover. These acts may not
have been the cause of the accident, but they strongly imply to the
jurors that the defendant did not do all that he should have done.
Even when res ipsa is allowed, the verdict probably will not be for
the plaintiff unless he presses home all available evidence of negligent
conduct. Res ipsa is not a short cut to case preparation.
JAMES

C.

HOOVER

34. Lobel v. American Airlines, 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 945 (1952).
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